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ARINA SHULGA*
1. INTRODUCrION
Despite the high political, economic, and regulatory risks asso-
dated with investing in Russia,' its vast oil and gas reserves2 con-
tinue to draw the interest of foreign investors. Throughout the last
decade, the participation of foreign investors in the exploration of
Russia's resources can be divided into three main stages: the early
1990s, when the Russian Federation made its first attempts to at-
tract foreign investment;3 the middle 1990s, when the first Law on
Production Sharing Agreements ("1995 PSA Law") was ratified,4
and 1999 to 2001, the era of a new Law on Foreign InvestmentA an
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1997,
Mount Holyoke College. I thank my husband, Sergei Izrailev, for his continuous
support and invaluable suggestions and comments.
1 According to the survey of country credit ratings by Institutional Investor,
Russia was ranked 92nd out of 145 countries. See September 2001 Country Credit
Ratings, II MAGAZ NE PLATINUM, Sept. 2001, at http://www.iiplatinum.com/rr
/premium/countrycredit/ccr/2001.htm.
2 As of December 2000, Russia had an estimated 49 to 55 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves and 1,700 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves. See US.
ENERGY INFo. ADmiIN., RUSSIA (2000), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
emeu/cabs/russfull.htm (last modified Feb. 22,2000).
3 E.g., The Law of Russian Federation No. 2395-1 on Underground Resources,
Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1992, No. 2395-1, translation available at LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLAW File, Garant 10004313; Law of the RSFSR of June 26,1991 on Investment
Activity in the RSFSR (with the Additions and Amendments of June 19, 1995),
Ross. Gazeta, 1991, translation available at LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File, Ga-
rant 10005703.
4 President Yeltsin signed this law on December 30,1995. See Federal'niy Za-
kon o Soglasheniyax o Razdele Produktsii [Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production
Sharing Agreements], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, No. 160-FZ [hereinafter 1995 PSA
Law], translation available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RFLAW File, Garant 10005771.
5 See Federal'niy Zakon ob Inostrannix Investitsiyax v Rossiyiskoi Federatsii
[Federal Law No. 160-FZ on Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation], Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1999, No. 19-FZ [hereinafter 1999 Law on Foreign Investment],
translation available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RFLAW File, Garant 12016250.
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Amendment to the 1995 PSA Law, 6 and the implementation of the
four chapters of Part II of the Russian Tax Code7 that deal with the
tax regulation of production sharing agreements.
The overall level of foreign investment in Russia has remained
low.8 In particular, the amount of foreign investment in Russia's
oil and gas sectors has fluctuated and taken different forms. The
once popular joint ventures with Russian oil companies were
gradually shifted into attempts to form joint projects financed by
commercial banks and multilateral agencies, and then again trans-
formed into direct purchases of shares in existing Russian oil pro-
ducing companies by foreign oil magnates.
Evaluations of potential foreign investment risks generally fo-
cus on the assessment of financial feasibilities of investors and the
risks associated with operations, commercial activities, legal
frameworks, and enforcement procedures, as well as political and
regulatory concerns in the host country.9 This Comment argues
that the peculiarity of investing in Russia's oil and gas sectors re-
sults from the extreme irregularity, uncertainty, and speculation
that surrounds Russia's legal and regulatory frameworks-thus
making legal and regulatory risks0 the key factors in foreign in-
vestors' interest to invest in Russia's oil and gas industry. The
6 See Federal'niy Zakon o Vnesenii Popravok v Federal'niy Zakon o So-
glasheniyax o Razdele Produktsii [Federal Law No. 19-FZ on the Introduction of
Amendments and Addenda into the Federal Law on Production Sharing Agree-
ments], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999 [hereinafter 1999 PSA Amendment], translation
available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RFLAW File, Garant 12014154.
7 See Nalogoviy Kodeks Rossiiyskoi Federatsii: Chast' Vtoraya [Tax Code of
the Russian Federation: Part II No. 117-FZ], Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2001, No. 117-FZ
[hereinafter, Tax Code Part II], translation available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library,
RFLAW File, Garant 10800200. Tax Code Part II was adopted by Duma on July
19,2000 and became effective on January 1, 2001. Id.
8 As of 1999, only $35 billion had been invested in Russia since the fall of the
Soviet Union, which is less than the annual foreign investment in China. See
Inostranie Investitori Obhodiat Rosiju Storonoj [Foreign Investors Avoid Russia],
KOMMERS., June 16, 1999, translation available at 1999 WL 11793940.
9 See generally EDWIN F. FEo Er AL., GUIDE TO FINANCING INTERNATIONAL OIL
AND GAS PROJECrS (1996) (canvassing different aspects of foreign investment and
the factors that attract financiers to oil and gas projects).
10 Legal risks include the inability of investors to rely "on a well-developed
body of commercial law to ensure enforcement of security interests, and on an in-
dependent judiciary and expedient legal process to pursue claims, if necessary."
Id. at 33. Regulatory risks include regulations pertaining to natural resources
management, access to resources, degree of intervention by the governmental
authorities, and rules regarding the establishment and operation of subsidiaries.
See id. at 41-42.
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Comment analyzes the three stages of Russian lawmaking related
to the oil and gas industry and evaluates how laws such as the
1995 PSA Law, Law of Subsoil, Law on Foreign Investment, and
the Tax Code have affected the types and amounts of foreign in-
vestment that flowed into the oil and gas sectors, shifting the focus
among joint ventures, project financings, and direct investments
into the Russian oil companies. The Comment argues that the in-
troduction of the 1995 PSA Law and its subsequent amendment
render the project finance method of foreign investment the most
preferable in light of the high risks associated with investing in
Russia. In addition, the Comment projects onto the future devel-
opment of foreign investment in the oil and gas sectors on the basis
of the latest Russian laws.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Comment address the political, eco-
nonical, and structural risks that foreign investors face when in-
vesting in Russia's oil or gas projects. Section 2 describes the pos-
sible political risks, such as a firce majeure, expropriation, the
nationalization of the oil and gas industry," the negative effects of
the August 1998 crisis on the Russian economy, and the current
administration's effort to improve Russias investment climate.
Section 3 reviews the structure of Russia's oil and gas sectors: ma-
jor oil and gas companies, their privatization efforts, and the op-
portunities for foreign investment The structural risks to foreign
investors include, but are not limited to, the present control of Rus-
sia's oil and gas sectors by Financial Industrial Groups led by for-
mer oil and gas ministers, the existence of an oil pipeline monopoly
that controls all oil transfers throughout the Russian Federation,12
and the lack of antitrust measures and willingness on the part of
the Russian government to end the Transneft and Gazprom mo-
nopolies. Section 4 explores legal and regulatory risks that existed
prior to the 1995 PSA Law and how the protectionist attitude of the
Russian politicians in the early 1990s, as reflected in the laws on
foreign investment and use of subsoil, discouraged foreign invest-
ment in the oil and gas industry.'3 Section 5 views the 1995 PSA
1 For a detailed description of these risks, see id. at 23-57.
12 See infra Section 3.2.
13 See, e.g., Russian Oil: A Little Crude, EcONOMIST, Jan. 20, 1996, at 63 (dis-
cussing the 1996 Russian Law of Production Sharing Agreements and its possible
negative implications for foreign investments). But protectionist fears of the Rus-
sian politicians were still present in 1999, when they were reflected in the 1999
Amendment to the PSA Law, which required foreign investors to give Russian
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Law as the first major initiative taken by the Russian government
in attracting foreign investment, even though it also proved to be
mostly unsuccessful. Section 6 analyzes how the recent amend-
ments to the Law on Foreign Investment, the Law of Subsoil, the
1995 PSA Law, and the Tax Code provide a new regulatory
framework that favors foreign investment in Russia's oil and gas
sectors. Section 7 evaluates various types of foreign investment in
Russia's oil and gas, including project financing and direct foreign
investment in the oil companies. This Section analyzes the risks
and advantages of both methods and argues that project financing
becomes more preferable in the current regulatory climate that fa-
vors and facilitates production sharing agreements ("PSAs"). Fi-
nally, this Comment evaluates Russia's past regulatory experiences
in the oil and gas sectors and predicts how the new laws, coupled
with the lessons derived from the past regulatory attempts, may
change the types and amounts of future investments and favor the
use of project finance for future investments. The fact remains that
Russia, with its substantial oil and gas resources, shares common
interests with the foreign oil companies in a joint exploration of the
Russian oil and gas. Once legal and regulatory risks are reduced,
foreign participation in the development of Russia's natural re-
sources will increase dramatically.
2. ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RISKS
Many factors influence the flow of foreign investment into Rus-
sia. These factors include, among others: the availability of a
regulatory structure designed to provide guarantees and incentives
to foreign investors, permission to invest in certain sectors, the ex-
istence of necessary laws that would protect the investors' interests
and alleviate tax burdens, and the commercial viability of the proj-
ects, including the availability of oil export routes, favorable mar-
ket prices, and demand.14 In addition to the above, local currency
devaluation remains a real threat.15 Importantly, Russia's long-
companies the priority right to become suppliers, contractors, and carriers for PSA
projects. See infra Section 6 and accompanying notes 139-40.
14 See Mark R. Yzaguirre, Project Finance and Privatization: The Bolivian Exam-
p/e, 20 HousToN J. INT'L L. 597,610-15 (1998).
15 See Kent F. Moors, Fiscal Imbalance, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Aug. 2001,
at 19 (noting that Russia's current influx of foreign currency increases domestic
inflationary pressures because a "surplus of hard currency becomes translated
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term political and macroeconomic factors play vital roles in at-
tracting foreign investment. Political risks of investing in Russia
include a danger of outright expropriation 16 of oil or gas projects
by the government or of creeping expropriation that is a result of
"altering the rules of the game to such a degree that the investor's
financial calculations and projections based on feasibility studies
become useless."17 Additionally, investors should not discount the
risk of nationalization of the entire industry 8 Finally, there is a
risk of force majeure,9 including a risk of political violence.20
The foreign investors in Russia should not disregard the politi-
cal risks listed above. In the past several years, Russia's political
environment was marked by continuous changes in the top leader-
ship.2' A more pro-Western government of the early 1990s, with
Yegor Gaidar as an acting Deputy Prime Minister, was gradually
replaced with politicians who favored slow reforms.2' In addition,
the ongoing Chechen crisis that cost the Russian government $2
billion in 2000 aloneP has rendered uncertain the future of the
Russian Federation's political integrity.
The status of Russia's economy also raises concerns for foreign
investors. Russia's financial crisis in August 1998 had a devastat-
ing impact on the Russian economy. Gross domestic product
("GDP") declined from around $428 billion in 1997 to $282 billion
into a surplus of rubles when the hard currency is redeemed, since the ruble is the
only official currency for transactions in the Russian domestic economy.)
16 See FEO Er AT-, supra note 9, at 35 (discussing how outright expropriation
may be lawful if certain conditions are satisfied, most importantly, if the host gov-
ernment provides adequate compensation for the expropriated project).
17 Id.
18 See infra Section 3.1.
19 Force majeure is an "event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor con-
trolled. The term includes both acts of nature (e.g., floods and hurricanes) and
acts of people (e.g., riots, strikes, wars)." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 657 (7th ed.
1999); see also GRAHAI D. VINTER, PROJECt FINANICE 88-94 (2d ed. 199S) (delineating
limits to the concept offrce majeure and the limitation of liability).
20 See FEo ET AT., supra note 9, at 35 (defining political violence as "any type of
violent act undertaken with the primary intent of achieving a political objective').
2 For example, the Russian Ministry of Energy had ten different ministers in
the last ten years. Mikhail Kroutikhin, Tyros to fhz Fore, Russ. Pmrozmi
INvESTOR, Aug. 2001, at 7.
22 Davis Filipov, Putin Now Mired in Clwd nya, BOSTON GLoas, June 21, 2001,
atAl.
23 See Albert Galyazimov, Oil Dollars Again!, VERSIYA, Dec. 12-18, 2000, lrms-
lation available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RUSNVS File.
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at the end of 1998.24 The inability of Russian banks to meet their
debt obligations and the government's suspension of foreign debt
payments caused many foreign investors to flee. In the first half of
1999, the total volume of foreign investments fell by 44.5% to $4.27
billion, as compared to the first half of 1998, before the crisis.2 5 As
a result, Russia, which already heavily depended on tax revenues
and export earnings from its oil and gas industry, had to place an
additional burden on that sector.
26
Yeltsin's resignation on New Year's Eve of 1999 left Russia to
Vladimir Putin, then a Prime Minister, who was elected President
in March 2000. Putin has emphasized his commitment to improv-
ing Russia's investment climate.27 In 2000, Russia's GDP grew by
7.6%, which placed Russia among the ten fastest-growing econo-
mies. 28 However, Russia's analysts remain skeptical as signs of a
world economic slowdown are coupled with fluctuating world oil
24 The World Bank Group, WDI Data Query, available at http://devdata.
worldbank.org/data-query/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
25 Foreign Investment Promotion Center under the Ministry of Economy of
the Russian Federation, On Foreign Investments into the Russian Federation,
http://www.fipc.ru/fipc/reviews/statjul99.html (last modified Nov. 23, 1999).
Foreign investment in the Russian Federation in the first half of 2000 was $4.8 bil-
lion. See Investment in Russian Regions in First Half of 2000, INTERFAx RUSS. NEWS,
Nov. 16,2000, translation available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RUSNWS File.
26 The oil industry is one of the largest economic sectors in Russia. "Oil ex-
port revenues account for almost 40% of the country's foreign currency inflows,
and taxes levied on oil and gas companies account for more than 50% of the fed-
eral government's tax receipts." Tina Obut et al., Roots of Systemic Woes in Russian
Oil Sector Traceable to Industry Evolution, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 25, 1999, at 27. For ex-
ample, in 2001, the total projected oil and natural gas revenues will exceed $40
billion, which is $23 billion more than in 2000. See Kent F. Moors, Fiscal Imbalance,
Russ. PETROLEUM INvEsroR, Aug. 2001, at 19. In December 1999, Putin signed a
resolution increasing oil export duty to 15 euros per ton ($2 per bbl), which re-
sulted in $640 million in additional revenue each month. See U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., RUSSIA, supra note 2.
27 See, e.g., Vladimir Putin: Attraction of Foreign Investments Into Russia Is the
Most Important Factor of Her Integration into Global Economy, Russ. EcoN. NEWS, Oct.
31, 2000, at 1, available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RUSNWS File (describing Putin's
commitment to ease tax burdens and restructure the banking system to entice for-
eign investors); Sergei Kovalev, The Putin Put-On, N.Y. REV., Aug. 9, 2001, at 29
(critically discussing current domestic policies of Putin's administration).
28 See Vladislav Kuzmichev, Russia Among the Ten Fastest-Growing Economies,
NEZAViSiMAYA GAZETA, Dec. 29. 2000, translation available at LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RUSNWS File.
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prices and continuous efforts by the Russian government to service
its debt to the Paris Club. 30
In theory, foreign investors can mitigate political and economic
risks by changing the structure of their projects. Some of the alter-
natives that do not require intervention by the host government in-
dude: restructuring the deal so as to minimize the exposure of the
investors' assets at risk, ensuring the investors' control over issues
that may lead to expropriation, "forming a joint venture with a lo-
cal company; ensuring extensive local participation in the project;
[or] including a multilateral agency in the financing."31 However,
political risk factors, with the probable exception of force majeure,
depend largely on the regulatory framework of the host country at
the time of the project and the government's readiness to change
laws that may discourage foreign participation. Most oil and gas
exploration projects extend beyond six years3 2 and there is a high
risk that the laws that were in force at the beginning of a project
may be replaced several years later by new regulations.33 Thus,
regulatory and legal risks of foreign investment in a country like
Russia, where laws are still being formed and may change drasti-
cally within a decade, are pivotal to the evaluation of political and
economic risks, and affect the structure and amount of foreign in-
vestment
29 Paris Club is an informal group of creditor nations that meets with debtor
countries that have defaulted or are about to default in order to negotiate re-
scheduling of outstanding debt. See Paris Club, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.dubdeparis.org/en/tools/faq (last visited Oct. 29, 2001). Russia's
debt to the Paris Club, which constitutes one-third of Russia's total foreign debt,
was restructured in 1999. As a result, Russia's payments in 2000 declined from
$13.5 billion to $9.5 billion, but are expected to increase again to $18 billion in
2003. See Standard & Poor's, Russia Raises Stakes in Coifrontational Gane with the
Paris Club, available at http://wwiv.standardandpoors.ru (Jan. 10, 2001).
30 See Standard & Poor's, supra note 29. The Russian budget for 2001 has not
included the additional $3.5 billion that Russia needs to cover its dues to the Paris
Club. See Galyazimov, supra note 23. However, Standard & Poors noted that the
Russian Central Bank's reserves of $24.3 billion as of the end of 2000 have in-
creased optimism about Russia's ability to service its foreign debt in 2001. See
STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 29.
31 FEO Er AL, supra note 9, at37.
32 See id. at 36-37.
33 See, e.g., discussion infra Section 4.3 (describing the Sakhalin-I and II oil
projects that were formed in 1995 but only Sakhalin-lI started producing oil in
1999). The 1995 PSA Law was amended in 1999. See 1999 PSA Amendment, supra
note 6.
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3. RussiA's OIL AND GAS SECTORS: STRUCTURAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL RISKS
Partial privatization of the Russian oil companies and the ex-
isting monopolies in the oil transportation and gas sectors suggest
a strong continuing influence of the Russian government on the
operation of the oil and gas sectors.34 The absence of legal and
regulatory frameworks addressing many structural and opera-
tional aspects of oil and gas companies contributes to the reluc-
tance of foreign investors to work with Russian companies. In
particular, Russia lacks public disclosure obligations on the part of
oil and gas companies, laws addressing oil exportation problems
experienced by many project developers, and antitrust measures
and regulations to curtail the broad power of Gazprom, Russia's
gas monopoly.
3.1. Privatization of Russia's Oil Sector
Structural and organizational problems in Russia's oil and gas
sectors should caution foreign investors who consider committing
their capital to Russia. For instance, privatization of Russia's oil
production sector has served as an example of opaqueness and
possible conspiracy in the Russian market. Russia launched priva-
tization of many oil companies through the Law on Underground
Resources and the adoption of a new constitution in 1993.35 Cur-
rently, Russia's oil sector mostly consists of vertically-integrated
companies ("VICs"), some of which are: Lukoil,36 Yukos, Surgut-
neftegaz, Tyumen Oil Company ("TNK"), Sidanko, Sibneft, Slav-
neft, Eastern Oil Company, Orenburg Oil Company (Onako), Ko-
mitek, Chechen State Oil Company, and Rosneft.37 Originally, the
34 See Obut et al., supra note 26, at 30 ("The power vested in [ministry of fuel
and energy and committees for geology and mineral resources] is administrative
rather than managerial .... However, the agencies continue to wield proxy power
in the form of licensing requirements, regulation of prices, and influences on leg-
islature and on Transneft...
35 See id.
36 Lukoi is the largest VIC in terms of production and its reserves of 16.8 bil-
lion bbl of oil and 1.1 tcf of gas (as of 1998) make it the largest private owner of oil
reserves in the world. Tina Obut et al., Comparing Russian, Western Major Oil Firms
Underscore Problems Unique to Russian Oil, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 1, 1999, at 20, 21
[hereinafter Russian Oil].
37 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RUSSIA, supra note 2; see also Russian Oil, supra
note 36, at 21-24 (providing additional information about Russia's largest VICs).
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privatization was only partial: the Russian government retained
the controlling interest in the industry3s and limited foreign owmer-
ship to fifteen percent in the oil sector.39 As of October 2001, sev-
eral of the VICs, such as Rosneft, still remain fully state-omned.
Sale of the VICs during 1995 to 1997 occurred at sub-market prices
and resulted in a transfer of control of these companies to the Fi-
nancial Industrial Groups. 40 The current ownership of these finan-
cial groups and the VICs has substantially remained in the hands
of the former Soviet oil and gas elite.41 In addition, although the
Russian government has been selling its remaining shares in
VICs,42 there are rumors about deprivatization and the creation of a
national oil company. 3 The possibility of such an event is remote,
3s See Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1403 on Specific
Features of Privatization and Reorganization Into Joint-Stock Companies of State-
Sector Enterprises, Production and Scientific and Industrial Amalgamations in the
Old and Oil-Refining Industry and Oil Supplies (with Amendments and Addi-
tions of Apr. 10,1998, Sept. 25,2000, and May 29,1995), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1992,
No. 1403 [hereinafter Presidential Decree No. 1403], translated in LEXIS, Intlaw Li-
brary, RFLAW File, Garant 297; see also Dylan Cors, Breaking thw Bottleneck: The Fu-
ture of Russia's Oil Pipelines, 7 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'LL. 597, 601-04 (1997) (provid-
ing "the context for a discussion of pipeline policy describing the privitization of
Russina oil producers").
39 See Presidential Decree No. 1403, supra note 38, art. 5(b). The subsequent
decree repealed this limitation. See Decree of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion No. 1148 on the Effect of Specific Acts of the President of the Russian Federa-
tion, Sobr. Zakonod RF, 1997, No. 1148, translation available at LEXIS, Intlaw Li-
brary, RFLAW File, Garant 12004030.
4 See Obut et al., supra note 26, at 30. "Under the loans-for-sliares scheme, the
government relinquished its shares in VICs as collateral for loans to the govern-
ment from Russia's newly privatized banks." Id. The subsequent government's
default on these loans transferred control of the companies to those banks. See id.
For a critical discussion of the loans-for-shares method of privatization of the Rus-
sian oil companies, see Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Rts-
sian Privatization and Corporate Governance: Wltat Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L REV.
1731 (2000).
41 Lukoil CEO Alekperov is a former minister of the oil industry in the Soviet
government, Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former chairman of Gazprom, was the
Prime Minister of Russia; Mikhail Khodorkhovsky, chief executive of Yukos, was
a high ranking Communist Party official; Rem Viakhirev, president of Gazprom,
was a minister of the gas industry in the Soviet government. See id.
42 For example, in 1999, the Russian government sold its forty-nine percent
share in TNK. See id. In September 2000, the Russian government sold its eighty-
five percent stake in Onako for $1.1 billion, which was more than double the be-
ginning price. See Oil Change, EcoNOMISr, Sept. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL
8143760. Rosneft, however, is still owned by the Russian government. See Kent F.
Moors, Partnerfor All Seasons?, Russ. PEmoLEuM INVEsrOR, Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 5.
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but it is one of the risks that may negatively affect foreign direct
investment in Russia's oil.
3.2. Russia's Oil Pipelines
Another structural impediment to foreign investment in the oil
sector is the state control of the oil pipeline monopoly and its ex-
emption from any reporting requirements. Such exemption sur-
rounds the operation of a key sector in Russia's oil industry with
complete secrecy and deters potential investors from participating
in Russia's oil exploration projects. The main problem for foreign
companies arises from the absence of regulatory requirements that
would compel the oil pipeline monopoly to allow transport of ex-
tracted oil through its pipelines. The pipeline enterprise is owned
and controlled by a federal monopoly, Transneft, in accordance
with Article 4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1403.44 A number of
joint-stock companies within Transneft own the actual pipelines.45
Transneft does not reinvest much of the proceeds in the pipeline
system, and unlike other holding companies, Transneft is exempt
from quarterly reporting requirements. 46 The company exercises
complete control over the access to pipelines, and allegations
abound that it has accepted bribes for the use of its pipelines at
around $2 to $3 per ton of oil.47 The current monopoly in oil trans-
portation also allows the government to charge extra fees to cover
certain projects, such as restoring portions of the Chechen bypass,
which ultimately serves as 'backdoor taxation.'48 Such a monopoly
may create significant problems in exportation of oil from remote
Eastern Siberian or Northern sites. There is currently no law that
43 See id. at 5 (noting that Fuel and Energy Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny sup-
ported a formation of a state oil company).
44 See Presidential Decree No. 1403, supra note 38, art. 4(c) (transferring the
controlling number of shares to the newly created state-owned holding company,
Transneft). For more information on Transneft, see generally Nick Mikhailov,
Russia's Pipeline System and Oil and Gas Transportation Projects, at
http://bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/000818rspipetrans.htm (Aug. 2000) (pro-
viding a general overview of Transneft and stating that the company will play a
central role in upgrading and modernizing Russia's extensive pipeline infra-
structure).
45 See Cors, supra note 38, at 607.
46 See id.
47 Oil. Just Too Terrible To Resist, EcONoMisr, Sept. 9, 1995, at 66.
48 See Kent F. Moors, Blazing Its Own Trail, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Jan.
2001, at 12.
1076 [22:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss4/6
RUSSIA'S OIL AND GAS
would require the Russian government to issue regulations pro-
tecting the exportation interests of foreign companies. The bottle-
neck, therefore, remains virtually unregulated. Even the draft Law
on Pipeline Transport, if adopted in its current form, will not pro-
vide sufficient assurance of oil export routes. 49 The Law will re-
quire Transneft to provide equal access to all those seeking to
transport oil, but only if the application for shipping is submitted
using the correct form and in advance. If the demand for oil trans-
portation exceeds a pipeline's capacity, oil will be transported pro-
portionately to each applicant's total production. 0 The problems
encountered by the Kharyaga oil development project in negotiat-
ing its export routes with Transneft exemplify the extent of the dif-
ficulty. Kharyaga oil field, which is in the far east province of Ti-
man-Pechora, is an oil production project, equity shares in which
are split among the French TotalFina (fifty percent), Norway's
Norsk Hydro (forty percent), and Nenetsk Oil Co. (ten percent),1
Although the PSA for the exploration of the Kharyaga oil field was
signed by the Russian Federation in 1995, it became effective only
in 1999. One of the causes for the delay was the uncertainty of ex-
portation routes that would allow the project to export all of its
production, as was specified in the PSA.52 After exhaustive nego-
tiations between the Kharyaga project and Transneft, the pipeline
monopoly remains interested only in short-term agreements for
transportation of Kharyaga oil, whereas the project's total life is
estimated to be approximately thirty-three years.
In the near future, Transneft's monopoly may end. In the fall
of 2000, the Russian government contemplated a sale of twenty-
five percent of its interest in Transneft, thus reducing its holdings
to fifty-one percent 54 Also, Lukoil, the largest oil producing com-
pany, has directly challenged the Transneft monopoly by an-
nouncing in early 2001 its plan to build a separate oil pipeline.5.
49 See North v. South, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Jan. 31,2000, available at http:
//www.wtexec.com/rpiOl3lO3.html.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id. (noting that an average export quota is over thirty-six percent).
53 See id.
54 See Moors, supra note 48, at 13.
55 See id.
2001] 1077
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
3.3. Investment Opportunities in the Gas Sector
There are opportunities for foreign investors in Russia's gas
sector. Gazprom, the Russian natural gas production and trans-
mission monopoly, controls approximately seventy percent of Rus-
sia's natural resources.5 6 Gazprom inherited all of the Soviet gas
industry and maintained its monopoly even after it was privatized
in 1992.57 Although foreign direct investment in Gazprom was
limited to fifteen percent of its outstanding shares,58 opportunities
for creating joint ventures with Gazprom exist in the area of pipe-
line construction and gas distribution. For instance, Gazprom' s
Blue Stream project of building a pipeline to Turkey, a joint ven-
ture with Italian partner ENI, plans to start gas deliveries in 2001.59
The Russian Duma ratified a protocol regarding tax breaks for
Gazprom for the Blue Stream project in 1999.60 Gazprom has also
announced joint ventures with Finnish and Dutch companies for
construction of pipelines to deliver Russian gas to Western
Europe.6' In addition, the Russian government is creating oppor-
tunities for foreign and domestic investors to enter the Russian gas
market as competitors to Gazprom.
Weak antitrust laws may contribute to cautious attitudes by
foreign investors towards Gazprom. As of 2000, "Gazprom
overs[aw] eight production associations, own[ed] and operat[ed]
Russia's 88,000-mile gas pipeline grid, r[an] trading houses and
marketing joint ventures . . . and control[led] one-fifth of the
world's natural gas reserves."62 Government pressure to disinte-
56 Gazprom, INTERFAX Russ. NEWS, Aug. 31, 2000, available at LEXIS, Intlaw Li-
brary, RUSNWS File; see also JONATHAN P. STERN, COMPETITION AND
LIBERAIZATION IN EUROPEAN MARKETS 158 (1998) (remarking that "Gazprom has a
transmission and wholesale monopoly of all large customers, including distribu-
tion companies" and Russia's only gas export company, VEP Gazexport, is a
wholly owned subsidiary of Gazprom).
57 Currently, the federal government owns 38.37% of Gazprom, and foreign
investors own 10.31%. See GAzPRoM, SHAREHOLDER'S PAGE, at http://www. gaz-
prom.ru/eng/billboard (last visited Nov. 14, 2001). Management officials own
approximately thirty-five percent of Gazprom and the owners of the remaining
twenty-seven percent are unknown. See Black, Kraakman & Tarrasova, supra note
40, at 1774.
58 See Presidential Decree No. 1403, supra note 38, at 5(b).
59 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., RUSSIA, supra note 2.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 Id.
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grate Gazprom is also mounting. In 1997, the Federal Energy
Commission created a report, which proposed to separate the pro-
duction from the transmission spheres of Gazprom and to encour-
age new investors to develop new and existing fields and pipe-
lines.63 Even though no immediate action followed this reportO
according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration report,
the Russian Duma approved a draft federal law directed at ending
Gazprom's monopoly by establishing trade companies to compete
with Gazprom and offering equal access to gas pipelines.63 The fi-
nal break-up of the Gazprom monolith may be slow to come, but
the Russian government has already embarked on the path of in-
troducing competition into the gas market.
4. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
ADOPTED IN T-E EARLY 1990s
Legal and regulatory risks of investing in Russia's oil and gas
sectors were particularly high in the early 1990s, when the Russian
Federation began to establish a framework of laws regulating for-
eign investment. The 1991 Law on Foreign Investnents reflected
the determination of the Russian government to develop fuel and
energy sectors without foreign participation, 67 and the Law also
provided little guarantee to foreign investors against political
risks,63 such as a coup d'6tat that occurred only one month after the
Law's enactment. Additionally, the 1991 Law on Foreign Invest-
ments and the 1992 Law on Underground Resources ("Law of Sub-
soil")69 determined the types of foreign investment that could flow
63 See STERN, supra note 56, at 160-61.
64 As explanation for inaction, Stem suggests that "[t]he roles of the Federal
Energy Commission, Anti-Monopoly Committee, Ministry of Fuel and Energy,
and the offices of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister seem to become
more and less influential on a monthly basis." Id. at 161.
65 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADmIN., RUSSIA, supra note 2.
66 See Federal'niy Zakon o RSFSR ob Inostrannix Investitsiyax v RSFSR [Law
of the RSFSR No. 1545-1 on Foreign Investments in the RSFSR], Sobr. Zakonod.
RF, 1991 [hereinafter 1991 Law on Foreign Investment], translation available at
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File. For a detailed discussion of the 1991 Law on
Foreign Investment, see infra Section 4.1.
67 See 1991 Law on Foreign Investment art. 20.
6s See id. art 7.
69 See The Law of the Russian Federation No. 2393-1 on Underground Re-
sources, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1992 [hereinafter Law of Subsoil], translation available
at LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File, Garant 10004313. For a detailed discussion
of the Law of Subsoil, see injfra Section 4.2.
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into the country by allowing foreign investors to repatriate profits
but not the products,70 thus making joint ventures with foreign
monetary investments preferable to production-sharing agree-
ments because foreign participants would be entitled to a certain
proportion of extracted oil.
Although the first Russian laws directed at attracting foreign
investment were inadequate, some foreign companies still invested
in Russia's energy sectors. From 1987 to 1990, twenty-seven joint
ventures were formed with foreign partners in the energy sector.7
However, the break-up of the Soviet Union increased the uncer-
tainty surrounding the obligations and entitlements of foreign in-
vestors in the Russian Federation. Consequently, as of 1995, only
about $700 million had been invested in Russia's energy sector,
"though more than $2 billion was most likely spent in search of the
investment opportunities." 72 Foreign investment in the oil and gas
industry in the early 1990s came in forms of joint ventures and
joint-stock companies.73 The number of joint ventures did not in-
crease greatly throughout the 1990s. As of 1999, only about 100
joint ventures were operating in Russia's oil and gas sector, the
most successful of which were applying new technologies to the
old fields in order to increase production.74 The main investments
to date are Conoco's Polar Lights, projects on Sakhalin Island,75
and the Timan-Pechora fields.7 6
70 See Law of Subsoil art. 10.
71 See James P. Dorian & Eugene M. Khartukov, International Oil and Gas In-
vestment in the CIS States, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 39 (Thomas W. Walde
ed., 1996).
72 Id. at 47. "Through early 1994, more than 70 joint ventures were registered
in Russia, with 40 being operational, but only 30 actually processing." Id.
73 See id. at 52-53 (noting that even though the production sharing agreements
were preferable, the law on production sharing agreements was still incomplete as
of early 1995).
74 See Joint Ventures in the Russian Oil Sector: Rocky Marriages?, OIL & GAS J.,
Jan. 25,1999, at 28.
7 Most of Russia's oil and gas reserves are in the Far East, with sixty percent
of those located on the Sakhalin Island. As of 1999, there existed three consorti-
ums developing oil and gas on Sakhalin Island. See id.
76 See id.
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4.1 Early Regulation of Foreign Investnent: T7e 1991 Law on
Foreign Investment
Russia's 1991 Law on Foreign Investment77 allowed foreign le-
gal entities to invest in Russia through share participation in enter-
prises, the formation of wholly foreign-owned operations, and the
acquisition of enterprises, property, and user rights8 . Article 7
provided guarantees against nationalization and confiscation, "ex-
cept for exceptional cases when such measures may be talken in the
public interest."79 As incentives to foreign investors, Article 24
provided enterprises with foreign investors an exemption from
custom duties and import taxes for items imported for the enter-
prise's own needs and Article 25 provided Russian-foreign joint
ventures with over thirty percent foreign participation an exemp-
tion from the requirement to obtain a license to import or export
products for their needs. Further, Article 10 allowed for free repa-
triation of hard-currency profits, dividends, and interest, but only
after the relevant taxes, such as a fifteen percent withholding tax,
had been paid.80 However, the 1991 Law on Foreign Investment
placed many burdens on foreign investors. It treated fuel and en-
ergy as restricted sectors for foreign investment&, required ob-
taining permission to open a large-scale construction projects with
the involvement of foreign investments2 , and mandated registra-
tion with the Ministry of Finance of all enterprises with more than
100 million rubles of foreign investment.
4.2. Law of Subsoil
In addition to the 1991 Law on Foreign Investment, investment
in the gas and oil industry was regulated by the Law of Subsoil."
The Law of Subsoil allowed production-sharing agreements with
foreign citizens and legal entities 3, but required the acquisition of
77 See 1991 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 66, art. 2.
78 See id. art. 3.
79 Id. art. 7. Foreign investors could appeal such state decisions in the courts
of law and arbitration. See id.
90 See icL art. 10.
81 Id. art. 20.
s2 Id. art. 14.
83 Id. art 16.
84 See Law of Subsoil, supra note 69, art. 10.
85 Id- art. 9.
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licenses for the use of underground resources86. Although the Law
allowed the use of concession agreements, production-sharing
agreements, and service contracts, it never fully defined these ac-
tivities and did not address the issue of consolidation of the re-
quired licenses and production sharing agreements.87 The Law of
Subsoil and the Regulations on the Issuance of Licenses for the Use
of the Subsoil of July 15, 199288 imposed charges on all users in
connection with the licenses: royalties (payments for the use of
underground resources), excise taxes, and charges for mineral re-
placement.89 Foreign investors also became subject to a multitude
of taxes.90
Further, Russia lacked a concessions law that would regulate
foreign participation in exploration of Russia's natural resources.
Although the draft of such a law has been circulated since 1993, the
regulation was unable to find the necessary support in the Duma
and the government. At the end of 1999, the State Construction
Committee asked the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment to assist in drafting the new concessions law.91
In summary, the 1991 Law on Foreign Investments and the
Law of Subsoil imposed heavy regulations on foreign investors
86 Id. art. 11.
87 See James W. Skelton, Jr., Investing in Russia's Oil and Gas Industry: The Legal
and Bureaucratic Obstacles, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 26,27 (1993).
88 See Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation No. 3314-1
on the Order of Carrying into Effect the Regulations for Licensing the Use of Min-
eral Resources, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1992, translation available at LEXIS, Intlaw Li-
brary, RFLAW File, Garant 10004319.
89 See Law of Subsoil, supra note 69, art. 39.
90 As of January 1,1995, all users of Russia's underground resources became
subject to: export duty (exemptions could be granted to joint ventures incorpo-
rated before January 1,1992 with no less than thirty percent of foreign investment
for no more than three years); VAT (20%, but waived for exports according to the
Law of the Russian Federation on Investment Tax Credit (with the Additions and
Amendments of July 16, 1992), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1991, translation available at
LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RFLAW File, Garant 2536); excise duty ($8.20 per ton of oil
or 15% for gas); royalties (6% to 16%); contributions for mineral reserves replace-
ment (10%); property tax (up to 2%); road-use tax (0.4 %); land tax (from $2 to $10
per hectare); profit tax (up to 38% -13% federal and up to 25% regional, although
reductions were available for joint ventures registered after January 1, 1994);
withholding tax (15%). See Dorian and Khartukov, supra note 71, at 55-57. Certain
enterprises with foreign participation are additionally subject to the 1991 Law on
Foreign Investments and are exempt from taxes, as discussed supra Section 4.1.
91 See Skelton, supra note 87, at 28; see also EBRD, Strategy for the Russian Fed-
eration (2000) [hereinafter EBRD], at http://www.ebrd.com/english/policies
/starts/russtratpdf (last modified Apr. 19,2001).
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interested in exploration of oil and gas in Russia and offered in-
adequate incentives. Protectionist attitudes of the Russian politi-
cians prevailed over the revenues that Russia could collect from in-
creased oil and gas production and exploration of new deposits.9Z
5. MID-1990S: NEW ATrTIDES, NEW REGULATIONS
Russia's participation in the Energy Charter Treaty signaled a
willingness on the part of the Russian government and Duma to
take steps to encourage foreign participation in the oil and gas
projects. The 1995 Law on Production Sharing Agreements, dis-
cussed below, was a response by the Russian government to the
Energy Charter Treaty.
5.1. Energy Charter Treaty
In 1994, Russia signed a multilateral Energy Charter Treaty
("ECT") that was directed at "establish[ing] a legal framework in
order to promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, based
on complementarities and mutual benefits."93 This treaty provided
guarantees to foreign investors in Russia's energy sector in the vital
areas of access to natural resources, trade regulation, transit, and
access to capital and technology.94 At the same time, ECT classified
Russia as a "country with a transition economy" due to Russia's
current state of development of a legal framework necessary for
foreign investments, and allowed Russia to suspend full compli-
ance with the ECT until July 1, 2001.95 As of June 2001, the Russian
92 See generally discussion infra Section 7 (describing Russia's need for foreign
investments to maintain adequate production levels).
93 Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, art. 2, reprinted in Dorian & Khartu-
kov, supra note 71, app. 2, at 624.
94 For example, paragraph I of Article 10 obliges each party to "encourage
and create stable, equitable, favorable and transparent conditions" for invest-
ments, provide "fair and equitable treatment" and not "impair by unreasonable or
discriminatory measures [investors'] management, maintenance, use, enjoyment
or disposal." Paragraph 12 of Article 10 requires each party to "ensure that its
domestic law provides effective means for the assertion of claims and the en-
forcement of rights with respect to Investments, investment agreements, and in-
vestment authorizations." Id. at 631-32; see also Andrei A. Konoplyanik, T7e En-
ergy Charter Treaty: A Russian Perspective, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 156, 163
(Thomas W. Walde ed., 1996).
93 Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 93, arts. 32(1), 32(3). For example, Russia
elected to suspend full compliance with Article 10(7) and to "require that compa-
nies with foreign participation obtain legislative approval for the leasing of feder-
ally-owned property." Id. art. 10(7).
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Duma had not ratified the ECT and the prospect of its ratification
remain uncertain.96 Although the ECT would play an important
role in attracting foreign investment to Russia by creating a more
stable investment environment, the treaty has not yet fulfilled the
hopes of creating a possibility of "being an external 'legislative
driving power' for the Russian internal legislative process." 97
5.2. Dubious Success of Production Sharing Agreements ("PSAs")
The 1991 Law on Foreign Investments and the Law of Subsoil
provided inadequate incentives to foreign investors. In 1993,
President Yeltsin directed the Duma to draft legislation addressing
the application of production sharing principles on the territory of
the Russian Federation.9 Two years later, in December 1995, the
Russian Duma passed the hotly debated 1995 PSA Law.99
The new law brought yet another change to the legal and
regulatory framework of foreign investment in Russia's oil and gas
sectors. The 1995 PSA Law opened additional joint ventures ave-
nues for investment. The law allowed oil companies to recover
their operating costs from the percentage of revenues gained in
their oil and gas projects. In theory, the 1995 PSA Law provided a
realistic solution to the high risks associated with oil and gas ex-
ploration projects: due to the high costs of machinery, operation,
maintenance, and transportation, as well as the uncertainty of re-
serves composition,100 the PSA structure allowed participants to re-
cover their costs without having to wait for their projects to be-
come profitable.
96 Ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty Would Be Good for Russia, ALEXANDER'S
GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS, Apr. 26, 2000, at http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news
/ntr12286.htm (last modified June 1, 2001).
97 Konoplyanik, supra note 94, at 165.
98 Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 2285 on Production-Sharing in
Subsoil Use, Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1993, translation available at LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
RFLAW File.
99 See 1995 PSA Law, supra note 4. The 1995 PSA Law defines a production
sharing agreement as one under which the Russian Federation grants "an exclu-
sive right for exploration, development and production of mineral raw materials
on the subsoil area provided for in the Agreement" and which will provide a
"procedure for sharing produced production between the parties to the Agree-
ment," meaning the Russian Federation and the participating investors. See id.
arts. 2,3.
100 See infra text accompanying notes 110-11 for a description of the uncer-
tainty of reserves composition at Sakhalin-I fields.
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The 1995 PSA Law was directed at attracting foreign investors
and regulating the government's relationship with oil producing
companies and attract foreign investment However, the law "fell
prey to protectionist politicians, who argued for safeguards to pre-
vent foreigners from cashing in on Russian resources while Rus-
sian firms were too poor to do so themselves."101 On one hand, the
1995 PSA Law had positive effects on foreign investment: Article
9.2 of the 1995 PSA Law exempted investors' export of oil from any
quantitative restrictions and Article 13.1 exempted investors from
any payments and taxes except for the profits tax and payments for
the use of subsoil. 02 On the other hand, the 1995 PSA Law had
numerous ambiguities and limitations: it could be applied only to
ten percent of all mineral reserves and only to the subsoil plots se-
lected by the government of the Russian Federation and an execu-
tive government body of a corresponding subject of the Russian
Federation.103 Additionally, the 1995 PSA Law left unresolved the
ambiguity in application for a license required by the Subsoil Law
to PSAs. The Law of Subsoil made the receipt of a license to use
the subsoil paramount, whereas Article 4.2 of the 1995 PSA law
made such requirement supplementary to the Agreement'04
Probably the most controversial provisions of the statute were Ar-
tide 16.1, which prohibited investors' assignment of their rights
and obligations under the Agreement to a third party without the
State's consent, and Article 17.1, which provided that amendments
to the Agreement could be made by either party "in case of a sig-
nificant change in circumstances in accordance with the Russian
Federation Civil Code." 105 Finally, Articles 22 and 23 on dispute
resolution and state immunity were ambiguous as to whether Rus-
sia would agree to be bound by the laws of any jurisdiction other
than the Russian Federation.10
101 Russian Oil: A Little Crude, supra note 13, at 63.
102 Investors are still subject to annual payments for conducting exploration
(rentals) and royalties (percentage of the production volume). See 1995 FSA Law,
supra note 4, art. 13.4.
103 See id. art 2.5.
104 See id. art. 4.2.
105 Id. art 17.1. For a discussion of these provisions, see Ernest Chung, Petro-
leum Investment in the Russian Federation-Russian Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Pro-
duction Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), 37 HARV. ITfL UJ. 551,557-61 (1996).
106 See 1995 PSA Law, supra note 4, arts. 22,23.
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The limited effectiveness of the 1995 PSA Law in achieving its
intended purpose, attraction of foreign investment to the oil and
gas industry, is best exemplified through the law's practical appli-
cation. As of October 1999, four years after the implementation of
the 1995 PSA Law, only three PSA projects started production:
Sakhalin I and II, connected with the exploration and drilling of
Sakhalin Island fields, and the Kharyaga field project, discussed
earlier in Section 3.2. Negotiations of the first PSA projects lasted
for an average of eight years and three months, despite the high-
level lobbying at the government level.1 07 Each project had to ob-
tain on average 1,500 permits in order to start operations.108
The Sakhalin Island exploration initiative includes four sepa-
rate projects and a variety of international sponsors.109 Sakhalin-I,
located offshore, is an international consortium and is now com-
prised of Exxon Neftegas (30%), Japan's Sodeco (30%), Sakhalin-
morneftegas-Shelf (23%), and Rosneft-Sakhalin (17%).110 The PSA
for the project was approved in 1995. However, Sakhalin-I's part-
ners have not yet declared their project to be commercially viable.
Until recently, their exploration efforts revealed only gas, which is
more expensive to extract and export than oil."' Sakhalin-II, val-
ued at $15 billion, has two fields off the coast of Sakhalin, As-
tokhskoye and Lunskoye, and is developed by Sakhalin Energy In-
vestment, a joint venture comprised of Marathon (30%), Mitsui
(20%), McDermott (20%), Shell (20%), and Mitsubishi (10%).112 The
107 See Marina Mikhilyukova, The PSA Patron, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR,
Sept. 2001, at 11.
108 See id. at 13.
109 Duma is expected to permit twelve new PSAs by the end of 2001, includ-
ing blocks of what is now known as Sakhalin-V, a 25,000-square kilometer block
just north of Sakhalin island in the Sea of Okhotsk. Sakhalin-V's reserves are es-
timated at 600 million tons of oil and 600 billion cubic meters of natural gas. See
Vladimir Baidashin, PSAs Gain Momentum, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Sept. 2001,
at 14.
110 See Jeanne Whalen, Companies: Sakhalin Oil Find Holds Promise, WALL ST. J.
(Eur.), Sept. 29, 2000, at 4.
11 See id. Additionally, in 1999 Russian authorities withheld the consor-
tium's drilling permit because of certain environmental violations. See id. In
comparison, Sakhalin-I's resource base is estimated to equal 17.1 million tons of
oil, 194 billion cubic meters of gas, and 17.1 million tons of condensate, whereas
Sakhalin-Il's resource base is 103.4 million tons of oil, 384.2 billion cubic meters of
gas, and 31.5 million tons of condensate. See Dean E. Gaddy, Yukos Priobskoye Lit-
mus Test for Foreign Investment in Russian E&P, OIL & GAsJ., Mar. 6, 2000, at 25.
112 See Whalen, supra note 110, at 4. In October of 2000, the President of Shell
Exploration and Production B.V. Rein announced Shell's plans to invest $5 billion
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PSA was approved in 1995 and the consortium started producing
oil in 1999.113 Sakhalin-Ill was awarded to the Mobil/Texaco con-
sortium but the production has not yet begun. Its PSA was ap-
proved on May 31, 1999.114 Finally, the Sakhalin-IV tender took
place in 1994, and is estimated to contain 200 million metric tons of
oil and 60 to 70 billion cubic meters of natural gas.
The Kharyaga oil project" 5 became the second project, after
Sakhalin-ll, to produce and export oil.16 Although the investors
were guaranteed the export of one hundred percent of produc-
tion," 7 the PSA terms "place[d] the Russian government's share of
oil at 47.7% at the initial stage, to be gradually increased to 73.8%
upon payback, plus a 6% royalty payment. The investors w[ould]
share the remaining oil in proportion to their equity stakes in the
project"" 8
In summary, the difficulty in obtaining PSA permits, state mo-
nopoly over the oil pipeline system, and the presence of a powerful
monopoly in the gas sector provided disincentives to investing in
Russia. The 1995 PSA Law, although it provided an opportunity
for a different type of foreign investment, was protectionist in na-
ture. As seen from the Sakhalin and Kharyaga experiences, the
PSA Law attracted some investment, but not nearly as much as it
could have. Also, an absence of investment from multilateral in-
stitutions limited the scope of prospective investors to rich oil
companies that had enough cash for investment
in the development of Sakhalin-II project, making Shell prospectively the largest
investor in Russia. See Shell to Invest $5 Billion in Development of Pilstun-Aslkzske
and Lunskoe Fields of Sakhalin-2 Project, Russ. OIL & GAS REP., Oct. 12, 2000, transla-
tion available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RUSNWS File.
113 See Whalen, supra note 110, at 4.
114 Federal Law No. 87-FZ on Areas of Subsurface the Right of Use of Which
May be Granted on Conditions of Sharing of Products (Kirinsk Long-term Block
of "Sakhalin-3" Project), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1999, translation available at LEXIS,
Intlaw Library, RFLAW File, Garant 12015503.
115 Its resource base is estimated at 152.9 million tons of oil See Gaddy, supra
note 111, at 25.
116 See Oil Just Too Terrible to Resist, supra note 47, at 66.
117 See discussion supra Section 3.2. (offering an explanation for KIaryaga
project's difficulties with export routes).
118 Oil Just Too Terrible to Resist, supra note 47, at 66.
2001] 1087
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. 1. Int'l Econ. L.
6. RECENT AMENDMENTS TO RUSSIA'S LAWS
In the last three years the Russian government enacted
amendments to its previous laws related to the regulation of for-
eign investment in the Russian Federation in general and in the oil
and gas sectors in particular. This Section will show how the new
amendments are geared towards minimizing the legal and regu-
latory risks connected with investment in Russia's energy sector.
However, the application of these laws and their enforceability still
remains to be tested.
6.1. The 1999 Law on Foreign Investment
The long awaited guarantees for foreign investment came with
the adoption of the 1999 Law on Foreign Investment.119 The Law
addresses many of the legal and regulatory concerns of foreign in-
vestors by granting them rights to sue and be compensated, and by
offering legal protection against certain political and economic
risks. The 1999 Law on Foreign Investment provides for the state
guarantees to foreign investors if investment conditions worsen.
Importantly, the Law codifies the principle of national treatment
for foreign investors, which was a major part of The Energy Char-
ter Treaty, discussed in Section 5.1.120 This principle was absent
from the 1991 Law on Foreign Investment. It includes the right to
purchase securities' 2', protect rights in Russian federal courts or in
an international arbitration court,122 transfer or assign property
rights' 23 repatriate funds abroad,124 and be compensated for na-
tionalization' 25 or illegal acts by "state bodies, local self-
government bodies and or officials thereof ... ."126 Unlike the 1991
Law on Foreign Investment, the current statute allows foreign in-
vestors to implement foreign investments in any form as long as
119 See 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 5.
120 See id. art. 4.1 "The legal treatment of the activities of foreign investors the
use of profit received from investments shall not be less favourable than the legal
treatment of the activities and the use of profit received from investments granted
to Russian investors." Id. art. 4.1.
121 See id. art 13.
122 See id. art. 10.
123 See id. art 7.1.
124 See id. art 12.
125 See id. art 8.
126 Id. art. 5.2.
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not prohibited by the current Russian legislation.2 Immediately
following the general clause are the exceptions to the principle of
national treatment, including those necessary for "protecting the
fundamentals of the constitutional system, morals, health, rights
and lawful interests of other persons, national defense and state se-
curity."128 Again, the exceptions of the 1991 Law on Foreign In-
vestment vaguely referred to "public interest,"'-9 whereas the pres-
ent law specifies the circumstances under which the exception
would apply. Although the present exceptions appear to be broad,
their exact scope will be determined through practical application.
Artide 9 protects for seven years the existing "priority" investment
projects and those with foreign participation over twenty-five per-
cent from unfavorable changes in the Russian law.130 "Priority"
projects are defined as those with charter capital of over one billion
rubles (approximately $40 million) or investment projects with for-
eign contribution of at least 100 million rubles (about $4 million).13 '
The grandfather clause of Article 9 applies to investments of at
least one billion rubles that have a duration of more than seven
years.132 Overall, the 1999 Law on Foreign Investment is a great
step towards attracting new foreign investments.
6.2. The New Law of Subsoil
Another positive development is the Federal Amendment to
the Law of Subsoil,'33 signed on January 2, 2000, which introduces
a dearly defined, although complicated, framework for the use of
subsoil. Artide 4 defines the length of the rights to use subsoil
plots for different projects (length may vary).' 34 Article 5 provides
fourteen ways in which an interested party may obtain the right to
use the subsoil plots, including tender or auction, and PSA3 The
12 Id. arL 6.
123 Id art. 4.2.
129 See 1991 Law on Foreign Investment supra note 66, art. 10.
130 See 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 5, art 9.
131 See id. art. 2.
132 See id. art. 9.3.
133 See Federal Law No. 20-FZ of Jan. 2, 2000 on Introduction of Amendments
and Addenda into the Law of the Russian Federation on Subsoil, Sobr. Zakonod.
RF, 2000, translation available at LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLAW File, Garant
12017895.
134 See id. art. 4.
135 See id. art. 5.
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law also defines the tender and auction procedures, and lists mul-
tiple ways in which the rights to use subsoil plots may be trans-
ferred or assigned.13 6 This law provides the necessary legal
framework for the use of subsoil.
6.3. The 1999 Amendment to the 1995 PSA Law and Other Related
Amendments
The highly anticipated 1999 PSA Amendment 137 to the 1995
PSA Law finally passed in 1999. It is possible that before August
1998 Russia still hoped to develop its oil and gas sectors without
help from abroad. However, the difficult financial crisis of 1998
prompted the Russian politicians to set aside nationalistic fears and
protectionist tendencies and welcome foreign investors. 38 Ac-
cording to the Petroleum Advisory Forum, the implementation in
1996 of twenty-four PSA projects, as was originally planned, would
have added $2.5 billion in direct and indirect government revenues
in 1998, $3.1 billion by 2000, and $64 billion by 2008.139
The 1999 PSA Amendment opened up thirty percent of Rus-
sia's hydrocarbon resources for PSAs instead of ten percent as pro-
vided in the 1995 PSA Law. 40 It also removed the requirement of
the Duma's approval of each PSA project. Responding to the pro-
tectionist fears of Russian politicians, the new Article 7 of the 1999
PSA Amendment requires projects "to grant Russian legal entities
the priority right" to become contractors, suppliers, and carriers for
PSA projects; to ensure that at least eighty percent of the projects'
personnel are citizens of the Russian Federation; and to place at
least seventy percent of all orders for needed technology and ma-
chinery with companies registered as taxpayers in Russia.141
Although the 1999 PSA Amendment facilitated foreign invest-
ments in Russia's oil and gas sectors, it still has drawbacks. One
example is the continuing presence of a "change in circumstance"
clause, which enables the Russian government to demand a greater
136 See id. arts. 9,13.
137 See 1999 PSA Amendment, supra note 6, at 1.
138 See Anna Sherman, Russia Tries to Come to Terms With West, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 4, 2000, at 38 (stating that Russia's new production sharing agree-
ments are seen as a last chance to draw foreign investment to its oil and gas sec-
tors).
139 See id.
140 See 1999 PSA Amendment, supra note 6, art. 3.2.
141 Id. art. 7.
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share of the output while the PSA project is already in progress.142
Another drawback is the exception that laws relating to health,
safety, and the environment are outside of the scope of PSA con-
tracts, which may subject investors to additional compliance obli-
gations should such laws change 43 Finally, there is a need for a
reconciliation among various tax laws, including the Tax Code,
and the tax provisions in the PSA Law. The present confusion sur-
rounding the tax treatment of PSAs, as discussed in more detail
below, may lead foreign investors to believe that they have no
guarantees that the present levels of PSA taxation would not be
raised when the next president comes into office.
Recently, the PSA Law was supplemented with the introduc-
tion of Part II of the Russian Tax Code,' 4 which provided rules for
paying value-added taxes ("VAT") and excise taxes. The first four
chapters of the Code became effective on January 1, 2001. These
chapters demonstrate the Russian government's commitment to
the law regulating PSAs. The Code fully preserves the existing tax
regulation of PSAs,145 and also improves and clarifies the related
tax laws.146 However, since the implementation of the Tax Code,
there have been concerns raised over the fact that all PSA tax
regulations should be contained in the Tax Code instead of the PSA
Law because only tax law can amend tax treatment of PSA projects
if a need for a change arises. 47 This led to attempts by various
governmental bodies to draft supplements to the Code, elaborating
on the relationship between the Tax Code and the PSA Law. On
December 20, 2000, Duma passed a draft law that has a discourag-
ing effect on the interests of foreign investors. Duma's amendment
introduced the principle of direct sharing, which would replace all
taxes, including taxes on profits, royalties, and rentals due to in-
vestors with a unified payment taken in produced products 4 The
142 I. art. 17.1, discussed supra Section 5.2.; David Slade, Contracts: Myth Vs.
Reality, Russ. PErRoLUM INVESTOR, Aug. 2001, at 42,48.
143 See 1999 PSA Amendment, supra note 6, art. 18. See also Slade, supra note
140, at48.
144 See Tax Code Part II, supra note 7.
145 See 1999 PSA Amendment, supra note 6, art. 13.
146 See Andrei Mescherin, Russia's New Tax Code Is More PSA Investor-Friendly
than Former Laws, Russ./CENr. EuL ExEcur vE GUIDE, SEPT. 15, 1999, available at
http://bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/001019rstxcdepsa.htm.
147 See Slade, supra note 142, at47.
148 See A New Scandal Around the Law on Production Sharing Agreement Has Bro-
ken Out, AGENcY WPS, Dec. 25, 2000, available at LEXIS, RUSNVS File; s-e also
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draft would expose foreign investors to double taxation: unified
tax in Russia and the tax on profit in their home country, 149 which
would be collected regardless of whether the investor elects to pay
the unified tax "because investors will not have relevant docu-
ments confirming payment of taxes in Russia." 150
In May 2001, the Russian Ministry of Finance produced its own
version of tax rules for PSAs, which appears to contradict the tax
provisions of the PSA Law.'51 The Ministry of Finance draft intro-
duces eighteen taxes in addition to the four taxes specified in the
1999 PSA Amendment. The draft "subordinates the PSA regime to
the general system of taxing profits ... thus subvert[ing] the con-
tractual foundation of production sharing and the principle of sta-
bility,"and does not allow tax deductions for non-reimbursable ex-
penses in contradiction to the 1999 PSA Amendment, and
eliminates the VAT exemption provided in the Tax Code and the
1999 PSA Amendment.152 Although neither version of the tax
regulations has become law, uncertainty surrounds the current and
future tax treatment of PSAs and may significantly deter foreign
investors and sponsors from committing large resources to the de-
velopment of PSAs in Russia. Overall, the 1999 PSA Amendment
was a promising step forward toward the promotion of foreign in-
vestment in Russia's energy sector. However, only a stable and
predictable legal environment, including favorable and reliable
PSA tax laws, can provide enough incentives to foster PSA growth.
The attitude of the general Russian public towards the 1999
PSA Amendment is ambiguous. Some are skeptical about the new
Sharing Production Law Amended, KOMMEPS., Dec. 21, 2000, reprinted in Russ. OIL &
GAS REP., Dec. 22, 2000 ("Under pressure from domestic oil companies, the Duma
has passed amendments introducing so-called direct sharing."), translation avail-
able at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RUSNWS File.
149 Participation in direct sharing is voluntary: either foreign investors pay
the Russian government all due rents, royalties, taxes on profit, and concede part
of their production, or they pay the unified tax and a tax on profit in their home
country. Previously, foreign investors paid taxes in Russia and the difference
between the Russian taxes and the taxes imposed by their home country. See
Sharing Production Law Amended, supra note 148.
150 Id. If the investors elect out of the direct sharing, international treaties
against double taxation would not apply since the election is voluntary. Id.
151 See 1999 PSA Amendment, supra note 6, art. 13.
152 Andrei Mescherin, Stability Undermined, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR, June-
July 2001, at 5, 6.
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PSA Amendment.153 They worry about the increasing foreign
control of Russia's economic development, foreign influence in
Russian politics, weakening of Russia's control over its strategic re-
sources sector, and potential environmental problems in ecologi-
cally sensitive areas. "The PSA is also seen as having the possible
effect of locking Russia into a raw materials dearth."5 But other
Russians are more optimistic: they see PSA-based investments as
contributing to the modernization of Russia's energy complex and
the development of Russia's infrastructure around the project ar-
eas, as well as discovery of new oil and gas fields.15
Throughout the 1990s, foreign investors faced a great deal of
uncertainty related to the applicable laws. This Comment has
shown how the laws relating to foreign investors in oil and gas
sectors changed unexpectedly in a short time. While the current
laws seem to favor foreign investment, there is no guarantee, based
on past experiences, that the laws will remain the same several
years from now. The uncertain future of PSA tax treatment seems
to once again discourage foreign investment in the energy sector
by exposing companies to potentially onerous taxation. A part of
the Russian public shares the protectionist and nationalistic atti-
tudes of certain Russian politicians, 56 and these attitudes may one
day regain the majority in the Russian Duma. Consequently, for-
eign investors should not disregard legal and regulatory risks and
should structure their investments so as to minimize them. The
next Section evaluates two popular methods of foreign investment
in the energy sector and argues for the preference of a PSA and
project finance combination.
7. PREFERRED TYPES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN RussIA's OIL AND GAs
Although some Russian protectionists may disagree, Russia
needs to attract foreign investment. Approximately eight to ten
billion dollars per year is needed to maintain the current levels of
oil and gas production. 57 "Failure to attract adequate investment
153 See Russian Oil and Gas Production-Sharing Agreements Promising but W11orri-
some, OIL & GAsJ., Oct 18,1999, at 36.
154 Id.
155 See id.
156 See supra text accompanying note 141.
157 Russian Oil and Gas Production-Sharing Agreements Promising but Wlorrisome,
supra note 153, at 36.
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would force Russia to either scale back oil exports or reduce do-
mestic consumption."'58 According to Dorian and Khartukov, for-
eign assistance is needed mainly in three areas: "the transfer of
technology, capital, and management skills." 59 Foreign capital is
needed to maintain the run-down equipment, modernize the ob-
solete technologies from the Soviet era, preserve the environment
in ecologically sensitive areas, and increase efficiency in oil pro-
duction.160 To attract high levels of investment, Russia needs to
minimize regulatory risks and provide incentives to foreign in-
vestors to find alternative sources of financing for its oil and gas
projects. As the oil and gas industry received hardly any funding
from the government in the early 1990s, joint ventures with foreign
investors were sought after for funding.'61 Project financing and
direct ownership of the Russian oil companies by foreign investors
became two alternative methods to funding projects in Russia's oil
and gas sectors.
This Section argues that the development of PSA agreements
makes the project finance model of investment in Russia's oil and
gas sectors more advantageous than foreign investors' direct par-
ticipation in oil companies' ownership. Although the latest laws
adopted in 1999 and 2000 reduced legal and regulatory risks by
providing foreign investors with greater legal protection, the Rus-
sian legal system is still in the formation stages. The current draft
Law on Joint Stock Companies has many ambiguous provisions
and inadequately protects the interests of shareholders. Without
the adoption and efficient enforcement of a new legal framework,
including an amendment to the Law on Joint Stock Companies, the
legal risks of direct investment, such as the absence of a well-
developed body of commercial law and enforcement mechanisms
that would enable project participants to seek legal recourse during
the lifetime of a project, are very high. The experience of several
158 Id.
159 Dorian & Khartukov, supra note 71, at 49.
160 See Cors, supra note 38, at 598-600 ("The poor maintenance of the pipelines
which did exist meant that in 1991 the newly independent Russian Federation in-
herited a network annually suffering an estimated 700 explosions and leaking
several million tons of oil."); see also Mikhailov, supra note 44 (explaining that
pipeline breakdowns typically occur due to corrosion, wear-out damages, tech-
nological, and construction defects, and that "[a]bout 50% of trunidines have been
in service for 30 years or longer, often surpassing their projected service life of 33
years").
161 See Dorian & Khartukov, supra note 71, at 48.
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foreign investors who decided to buy stakes in Russian oil compa-
nies, as illustrated in Section 7.1., revealed that Russian laws afford
inadequate protection of minority shareholders' rights and that
minority shareholders have little influence on company's opera-
tions. On the other hand, project finance is preferable for invest-
ments in Russia because, coupled with PSA agreements, it would
successfully minimize the legal, regulatory, and financial risks of
investing. As it will be explained in Section 7.2., the PSA agree-
ments assure project lenders that they would be able to recover
their investment through ownership of a percentage of initial
product output even before the project becomes profitable.
7.1. Buying Stakes in Russia's Oil and Gas Companies
From 1995 to 1997, several major Western oil companies an-
nounced their plans to buy Russian oil companies instead of de-
veloping new or existing oil fields. In November 1997, Royal
Dutch/Shell Group ("Shell") and British Petroleum PLC ("BP")
announced plans to invest about $1.75 billion into Russia's oil and
gas sectors. 62 Shell invested around $1 billion in Gazprom by
buying its convertible bonds and BP bought a ten percent stake in
AO Sidanko, Russia's fourth largest oil company, as well as a
twenty percent stake in eastern Siberian gas fields, controlled by
Sidanko, receiving forty-five percent of Sidanco's sixty percent
holding in that project.l63 Both of these deals resembled a 1995 deal
between Atlantic Richfield & Co. ("Arco") and Lukoil, in which
Arco bought $250 million of convertible bonds in Lukoil that gave
Arco a 7.99% stake in Lukoil (each bond was later converted into
170 shares of common stock).164
However, direct investment into Russian oil companies has its
risks, one of which is the lack of transparency of the companies
and the resulting speculation about the companies' assets and fi-
nancial position. Sidanko became subject to bankruptcy proceed-
ings in 1998 that resulted in an out-of-court settlement in the be-
162 See Matthew Brzezinski & Bhushan Bahree, The Eastent Oil Rush, WALL ST.
J. EUR., Nov. 18, 1997, at 1.
163 See id.
164 See Steve Liesman, Arco May Enter Russian Market Via Lukoil Deal, WALLSr.
J. EuR., Aug. 31,1995, at3.
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ginning of 2000.165 As a result of the settlement, TNK seized two of
the best production subsidiaries of Sidanko, Kondpetroleum and
Chernogorneftegaz.166 BP Amoco protested. In December 1999,
the United States blocked $498 million in loans to TNK for their
Samotlor oil field and Ryazan oil refinery projects after TNK's ac-
quisition of Chemogorneftegaz, "a move widely regarded as a de-
valuation of foreign investment."167 TNK and BP finally reached
an agreement in 2001 to jointly own and run Sidanko (TNK owns
eighty-four percent and BP owns ten percent of Sidanko)168 and the
Export-Import Bank released its loans.169
Another risk connected with direct investment in Russia's oil
companies is the weak protection of shareholders' rights. Yukos,
Russia's second largest oil company, was involved in litigation
with its Western minority shareholders, led by Kenneth Dart, over
Yukos's attempt to sell additional shares in some of its subsidiaries,
thus diluting the shares' value.170 Dart is believed to hold between
twelve and fourteen percent of Samaraneftegaz, Tomskneft, and
Yuganskneftegaz, three of Yukos's drilling subsidiaries."' Alleg-
edly, the additional shares were issued at a meeting to which
Western shareholders were denied admission. The issuance was
confirmed at another Yukos meeting, the location of which was
changed to over 100 miles outside of Moscow one hour before it
began.172 Dart sued Yukos and secured six international injunc-
tions to stop the transfer of the newly issued shares. On June 28,
1999 Dart won his first legal battle in the Samara court in Russia."3
165 BP Amoco, TNK Make Peace, Freeing Ex-Im Loans, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 10,
2000, at 38 (noting that Sidanko owes a total of $461.9 million, including $24.2
million to BP Amoco).
166 Chernogorneft was "the jewel in Sidanko's crown," with its output equal
to one-half of Sidanko's total production. See id. at 38.
167 Id.
168 See Kent F. Moors, World Class, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR, Sept. 2001, at
57 for particulars of TNK's purchase of Sidanko's subsidiaries and a subsequent
agreement with BP.
169 See id. at 57.
170 Russia's Regions: Western Siberia, Bus. Russ., July 10, 1999, available at 1999
WL 10863515.
171 Kent F. Moors, Landmark Shareholder Battle Heats Up at Yukos Oil Holding,
RUss./CENT. EuR. ExEcuTIVE GUIDE, June 30, 1999, available at http://
www.wtexec.com/ewf63099.html.
172 See id.
173 See id.
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The parties settled this dispute in December 2000.174 In a similar
situation, Slavneft's foreign shareholders' shares representing
12.6% of the outstanding shares were arrested and prevented from
participating in the annual meeting electing the new board mem-
bers.j 7 As a result, the foreign shareholders were unable to vote
for their preferred candidates. The above examples highlight some
of the risks that foreign investors assumed by investing directly in
Russia's oil companies due to the lack of legal protection for mi-
nority shareholders' rights and the absence of laws requiring
transparency in operations of Russian companies.
Concerns over the lack of minority shareholders' protection
have been recently addressed by the Russian Duma's adoption of a
draft law entitled "On Changes and Amendment to the Federal
Law 'On Joint Stock Companies," (the Draft Amendment).7 6
Once signed by the president, the Draft Amendment will provide
incentives to increase foreign direct investment in Russian compa-
nies. For example, minority shareholders' proposals will no longer
be rejected for minor technical violations and will be presented at
the general shareholders' meetings in their exact wording, meas-
ures will be implemented to limit the dilution of minority holders'
shares through dosed share issuance, and an increased number of
decisions will require the unanimous approval by the board of di-
rectors. 77 However, the Draft Amendment has met opposition
from Russia's powerful oligarchs, who particularly dislike the
unanimous voting requirement for an increasing number of deci-
sions and a lack of balance between the interests of majority and
minority shareholders.178 Thus, it remains unclear when the Draft
Amendment will be signed and whether it will be signed in its pre-
sent form.
174 Andrew Jack, Pouring Oil on Troubled Waters, FiN. TIMis (London), Jan. 19,
2000, at 21.
175 Slavnefts Foreign Shareholders Call Extraordinary Meeting, INTERFAX RuSs.
NEvs, Aug. 8, 2000, translation available at LEXIS, IntLaw Library, RUSNIVS File.
176 See Julia Romanova, Striving fir Clarity, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTO1, Sept.
2001, at 62-65. The proposed draft would amend the Federal Law No. 203-FZ on
Joint-stock Companies (previously amended on June 13,1996 and May 24,1999),
Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 1995, translation available at LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFLaw File,
Garant10005712.
17 See Romanova, supra note 176, at 62-63.
178 See id. at 65. The interests of majority shareholders are further limited by
the fact that the Russian Law does not allow freezing out of minority shareholders
with less than a certain small percentage of outstanding shares. See id.
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7.2. Project Financing of Russia's Oil and Gas PSA Deals
The 1999 PSA Amendment allowed more resources to be de-
veloped by foreign investors and relieved the investors from the
onerous requirement that each PSA project be approved by the
Russian Parliament.179 This recent facilitation of a PSAs' imple-
mentation should prompt more foreign investment into Russia's
oil and gas projects180 As discussed above in Section 5.2, the es-
sence of a PSA agreement is that the developer of the project (a
sponsor and/or lender in a project finance setting) shares the own-
ership of the produced oil or gas with the Russian government on a
contractual basis. Considering the long-term nature of PSA proj-
ects, a PSA contract is necessary to shield the project participants
from varying attitudes and regulations of the host government. A
PSA contract must be carefully negotiated. Most importantly, a
PSA agreement has to be legally enforceable against the host gov-
ernment (not against one of its agencies that may not exist five
years after the agreement is signed and may not have had the req-
uisite authority to enter into the PSA arrangement) regarding the
key rights of the project participants. These rights include, among
others, the right to produce, to import necessary equipment, to ex-
port production, and to own a certain portion of the output.18'
Additionally, project participants may elect to have foreign law
govern the PSA contracts, although questions remain about Rus-
sia's willingness to waive its foreign immunity. 8 2
The Kharyaga PSA project exemplifies a PSA project where at
the initial stages of production the Russian government allowed
the developers to export and sell more than fifty percent of the
'produced oil in order to recover their production costs.183 After the
project turns profitable, the Russian government will hold most of
the rights to the produced oil.
As discussed below, with a project finance method of financing
oil and gas developments, lenders may be reluctant to invest in
179 See discussion supra Section 6.3.
180 See Vladimir Baidashin, PSAs Gain Momentum, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR,
Sept. 2001, at 14 (discussing that by the end of 2001, Russia intends to conclude
twelve more PSAs to develop blocks of oil and gas reserves off the shore of Sak-
halin island).
181 See David Slade, Contracts: Myth Vs. Reality, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESTOR,
Aug. 2001, at 42.
182 See id. at 48.
183 See discussion supra Section 5.2., and text accompanying notes 111-14.
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projects where there is a high risk that they may not recover their
loans and additional interest The PSA arrangement insures recov-
ery of investments as soon as the project produces its first output
Thus, the recent amendment to the 1995 PSA Law provides incen-
tives to the project finance model of investment in Russia's oil and
gas sectors.
Project finance is a method of financing "in which the lenders
look principally to the cash flow generated by the operation of the
project for the source of funds from which the loans will be re-
paid."184 Lenders assess the creditworthiness of the project, rather
than of the sponsoring firms. Projects may be financed on a non-
recourse or, more commonly, a limited recourse basis.S Such
methods of financing provide incentives to the sponsors to engage
in developing projects even if they entail a higher than average de-
gree of risk. Foreign sponsors in Russia's energy sector will be
willing to develop projects only if they can expect a higher rate of
return than what they can get elsewhere. Lenders' interests coin-
cide with those of long-term sponsors, whose profits depend on
the success of the project. Other sponsors may have different in-
terests, such as securing supply contracts for the project.96 As a re-
sult of the possible divergence of interests, lenders usually require
the sponsors to contribute significant capital to the project. 87
Project sponsors form a separate legal entity that owns and op-
erates the project. The entity is most frequently a consortium or a
joint venture, depending on the tax and other benefits offered by
184 FEoEr AL, supra note 9, at3.
185 In a non-recourse project finance deal, sponsors are not liable to the lend-
ers for the money lent to the project. However, if the project fails, the lenders will
take the project's assets held as security for the loan, even if the assets were con-
tributed by the sponsors. In a limited recourse financing, lenders have some re-
course to the sponsors, either during certain early stages of the project develop-
ment or in cases of overspending the estimated project budget But even in
limited recourse financing, project lenders still look at the project for the main
source of repayment of their loans. See INRNATIONAL FINANCE CORFORATIO' N,
LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE, LESSON 7: PROJECT FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4-5
(1999) [hereinafter IFC].
186 See FEOEr AL, supra note 9, at 4.
187 "Lenders require sponsors to contribute equity to decrease the strain im-
posed on project revenues by debt service and also to create an incentive for proj-
ect sponsors to make the project successful." Id. at 11. Typical contributions
range from five to twenty-five percent, but may be as great as fifty percent for the
high risk projects. See id.
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the host country's regulations.188 International commercial banks
may become project lenders through providing loans on a syndi-
cated basis with a group of banks, thus spreading the risks and
raising larger amounts of money.189 According to the Russian Pe-
troleum Investor, "syndicated bank loans [would] remain the pri-
mary external funding mechanism for virtually all Russian oil
deals in 2000."190 A typical interest rate paid on such loans is
LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) plus seventy basis points
("bps"). Russia's syndicated loans are considered high risk and
carry a high interest. Thus, TNK, a Russian oil company, received
in October of 1998 a syndicated loan of LIBOR plus 450 bps; Sibneft
received LIBOR plus 400 bps, and only the Sakhalin-II project re-
ceived a significantly lower rate of LIBOR plus 175 bps in 1999.19,
Multilateral lending agencies and export credit agencies may
also provide project financing. Occasionally, several agencies in-
vest in the same project.192 Drawbacks of lending by multilateral
agencies may include a lengthy approval process, limitations on
the currency of the loan, and rigid environmental requirements. 9 3
Among the multilateral institutions involved in financing oil and
gas projects in Russia, International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), a
private entity of the World Bank, typically limits its investment to
up to twenty-five percent of a project's costs and offers a variety of
loans, equity, and quasi-equity financings.94 For example, in 1998
IFC provided a loan for $25 million and an equity investment of up
to $5 million to a project called Bitech-Silur JSC, owned by Bitech
Petroleum Corporation, a Canadian company, to fully develop
188 See id. at 8.
189 See id. at 13.
190 Kent F. Moors, Banking on Loans, Russ. PETROLEUM INVESToR, Jan. 31, 2000,
(stating that "[m]ajor foreign banks recorded at least $2.5 billion in direct losses
from Russian loan defaults and another $3 billion in related write-offs" in the sec-
ond half of 1998 though the end of the first half of 1999), available at http://
www.wtexec.com/rpiOl3lOl.html.
191 See id.
192 See FEo Er AL., supra note 9, at 15 (using for example the Polar Lights proj-
ect to develop the Ardalin oil field in Siberia, Russia, sponsored jointly by Conoco
Inc. and Russia's Arkhangelskgeologia, was financed in part by the IFC ($60 mil-
lion), the EBRD ($90 million), and OPIC ($50 million)).
193 See id.
194 See generally IFC, supra note 184 (discussing and explaining project finance
as a cost-effective investment tool that is becoming more popular for those in-
vesting in developing markets).
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three oil fields-South Kyrtayel, Lekker, and Subor-located in
Pechora, Komi Republic of Russia. 95
Another lending institution that promotes private development
in Central and Eastern Europe is the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development ("EBRD"). EBRD limits its involve-
ment to thirty-five pecent of the project costs, and imposes re-
quirements such as project sponsors with a proven record and
equity contribution of thirty-five percent from the sponsors.i9 As
of September 30, 2000, EBRD's contributed 629 million ecus, the
European Union's currency, to the financing of eleven projects in
Russia's oil and gas extraction sectors.1 97 Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation ("OPIC"), a U.S. governmental agency that of-
fers project financing and political risk insurance, became a lender
to the Sakhalin-II project, disbursing $59 million of its total $116
million commitment in June of 1998.193
Project financing is advantageous for sponsors because they are
not held liable for the project's loan defaults and thus their credit-
worthiness is not affected by the project's failure. Associated risks
of a project are allocated among many participants and do not re-
quire sponsors to bear the full financial burden.199 However, in or-
der to attract such financing, a project has to be already structured
with the necessary permits and licenses secured. This preliminary
stage of the project may be too expensive for some sponsors who
wish to limit their involvement in the project, pursue their own in-
vesting agenda, or initiate smaller ventures, which may not attract
the attention of the lenders. These sponsors may turn to direct in-
vesting in Russia's oil companies or they may form joint ventures
with Russian companies and assume their share of the risks. How-
ever, with the introduction of the PSA Law, sponsors may attract
external loans to even smaller projects if they receive permission
from the Russian governmental bodies to form production-sharing
193 See IFC Project Documents, Summary of Project Information, available at
http://wv4.worldbank.org/sprojects/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2001). For a de-
scription of other projects with IFC or EBRD financing, see IFC Press Release, 1FC
Approves First Projects in Russia Uune 17,1993), available at http://www.ifc.org
(last visited Nov. 5,2001).
196 See FEo ET AL., supra note 9, at 17-18.
197 See EBRD, supra note 91. Projects include KomiArctic Oil, Polar Lights
Co., and Sakhalin-ll (Phase 1) Oil Project. See id.
19 See OPIC Press Release, OPIC Makes First Disbursement to the Historic S!k-
halin Oil and Gas Project in Russian Far East (Uune 11, 1993) (on file vith author).
19 See FEo E AL, supra note 9, at7-8.
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agreements, according to which lenders would receive rights to the
Russian oil before any profits are realized by the project. A combi-
nation of PSAs and project financing may significantly raise the
number of oil exploration projects and the volume of extracted oil.
As the analysis of the recent amendments have shown, Russia,
a country that has the world's largest reserve of natural gas and
approximately 49 to 55 billion barrels of proven oil reserves,2 0 may
finally achieve its goal of attracting foreign investment to help ex-
plore its oil and gas deposits through the use of PSAs and project
finance.
8. CONCLUSION
In spite of the ambiguities surrounding PSA tax treatment,
Russia has achieved more in terms of attracting foreign investment
in its oil and gas sectors in the period of 1999 to 2001 than it did in
the previous twelve years of perestroika.2 1 Current stabilization in
Russia's political environment along with the presidency of Vla-
dimir Putin and his commitment to reform leaves foreign investors
optimistic that Russia will one day open its markets to global trade
and commerce. Throughout the last decade, legal and regulatory
uncertainties in the Russian system constituted the key risk factors
in investing in Russia's energy sector. Foreign investors interested
in participating in the exploration of Russia's vast oil and gas re-
serves had to restructure their investments to minimize these risks.
Currently, project financing of PSA projects presents the preferable
type of investing because it limits the financial exposure of project
sponsors, guarantees early returns on the loans of the lenders, and
protects certain rights of the project participants through a binding
contractual arrangement with the host government. However,
there is no guarantee that the Russian laws will remain unchanged.
Russia needs to demonstrate its commitment to attracting foreign
investment through the provision of consistent and reliable legal
and regulatory frameworks. Foreign investors need additional
guarantees that the Russian legislature will not again favor protec-
tionist laws of the early and mid-1990s. Russia also needs to re-
200 See U.S. ENERGY. INFO. ADMIN., RusSIA, supra note 2.
201 Perestroika is a movement started in 1987 by Mikhail Gorbachev directed at
restructuring the Soviet system into a market-oriented economy and introducing a
democratic political process.
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structure its oil transportation and gas sectors to introduce compe-
tition and facilitate the entry of foreign developers.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
* * * * * *
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss4/6
